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MOST PEOPLE  AGREE  that stock prices sometimes  behave  in strange  ways. 
Going  beyond  this simple  observation  typically  proves more  difficult. 
For at least the past quarter  century, economists have been well 
aware  that  the variation  of stock  prices  does not nicely  match  the  familiar 
bell-shaped  normal distribution.1  The problem is too many extreme 
movements.  Very  large  increases  or decreases  would  always  be possible 
even if changes  in stock  prices  were normally  distributed,  but  they would 
occur only rarely. By contrast, actual stock prices rise or fall by large 
percentage  amounts  fairly  often-certainly often  enough  to raise serious 
doubts  that  the usual  normal  distribution  provides  a useful  way to think 
about  how they vary. 
Economists  and other analysts of the stock market  have tended to 
react  to this  problem  in either  of two ways. The most common  approach 
is simply  to ignore  it and  go ahead  to analyze  changes in stock prices as 
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1. Application  of one of the many  central  limit  theorems  is often used as motivation 
for the normal  distribution.  Standard  references  that describe  the nonnormality  of stock 
returns  are  Mandelbrot  (1963)  and  Fama  (1965). 
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if they did fit the normal  distribution.  Whether  proceeding  this way is 
useful  clearly  depends  on  just how far  the reality  of stock price  variation 
is from  the normal  distribution,  as well as on the use to which  the results 
of the investigation  are  put. The second reaction  is to characterize  stock 
prices by some alternative  distribution  consistent with a greater fre- 
quency of large movements than under the normal  distribution.2  One 
drawback  to this approach  is that it sacrifices  the convenient simplicity 
that makes most forms of analysis based on the normal  distribution  so 
attractive  in the first  place. Another  is that no consensus exists on how 
best to model  the nonnormality  in equity  returns. 
The chief contention  of this paper  is that  extreme  movements  in stock 
prices  are  potentially  important,  both in practical  stock market  contexts 
and  for understanding  how the economy  behaves, and  that  failing  to take 
explicit account of the fact that such extraordinary  movements have 
occurred  from  time to time in the past-and  can occur at any time in the 
future-is therefore  a serious  omission.  In  particular,  the  paper  illustrates 
the potential  importance  of very large stock price movements by two 
examples-one bearing  on the  role  of the stock  market  (and  of speculative 
asset markets  in general)  in allocating  the economy's resources  and  one 
bearing  on how  what  happens  in  the  market  for  stocks (and  other  financial 
assets) influences  fluctuations  in macroeconomic  activity. 
Whether the stock market serves as an efficient mechanism for 
allocating  scarce capital  resources  is a long-standing  issue central  to the 
modern  private  enterprise  system. Prices set in the stock market  deter- 
mine  the actual  cost of new capital  for firms  that  issue shares  and, much 
more important  for the United States, the opportunity  cost of capital 
accumulated  by firms  that  retain  at least part  of their  earnings.  The basic 
rationale  for an economy's allocating  capital  in this way is the presump- 
tion that, both in the aggregate  and  at an individual  firm  level, the prices 
set in the stock market  are "efficient"  in the sense that  they embody  all 
available  relevant  information-or at least more such information  than 
any alternative  capital  allocation  mechanism  could bring  to bear.3  Not 
surprisingly,  an enormous empirical  literature  has developed around 
2.  Both Mandelbrot  and Fama  suggested  that stock returns  are well characterized  by 
the stable  Paretian  distribution.  Press  (1967),  Clark  (1973),  and  others  advocated  a mixed 
jump-diffusion  process. More recently Bollerslev, Engle, and Woolridge  (1988) have 
modeled  asset returns  with  an ARCH  process. 
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this subject, relying on a variety of procedures  to test whether stock 
rharkets  really  are efficient  in this sense. 
In recent years, many  such tests of market  efficiency  have turned  on 
whether  the returns  to holding  stocks exhibit  volatility  that  changes  over 
time, and even more important,  whether changes in the volatility of 
stock returns  are persistent  in the sense that greater  or lesser volatility 
observed at any given time implies correspondingly  greater or lesser 
volatility  for at least some interval  thereafter.  If shocks to volatility  are 
persistent,  then  movements  in the returns  required  to render  the demand 
for stocks equal  to the outstanding  supply  will also be persistent,  so that 
equilibrium  asset prices will tend to fluctuate  much more dramatically 
than  most standard  models  predict.4  Empirical  analysis  presented  in this 
paper,  based on an explicit distinction  between ordinary  and extraordi- 
nary  movements  in stock prices, provides  an explanation  for the consis- 
tent failure  of past research  to find  evidence of long-term  persistence  in 
the volatility  of equity  returns. 
Hyman  Minsky's  "financial  instability  hypothesis"  provides  an illus- 
tration  of the potential  importance  of extraordinary  stock price move- 
ments  for overall  fluctuations  in the economy.' Minsky  has long argued 
not only that  financial  crises play a central  role in causing  fluctuations  of 
real economic activity, but also that, as time passes after a financial 
crisis, behavior  changes  in such  a way as to reduce  the financial  system's 
ability  to withstand  shocks without  sustaining  some kind  of rupture,  and 
hence in such a way that the likelihood of the next financial crisis 
increases over time. Although  Minsky's hypothesis is typically stated 
with  less than  explicit  grounding  in the theory  of economic  behavior,  the 
analysis  presented  in this paper  shows that  when the fluctuation  of stock 
(or other asset) prices includes both an ordinary  and an extraordinary 
component,  each with about the same dimensions  as have prevailed  in 
the United States since World War II, behavior consistent with the 
Minsky hypothesis can follow as  a  result of  risk-averse investors 
continually  using  the limited  information  available  to them  to assess the 
market's  future  prospects  and  allocate  their  portfolios  accordingly. 
Because the Minsky  hypothesis is clearly about more than  just how 
investors allocate their portfolios  between stocks and other assets (at 
4. See, for example,  Poterba  and  Summers  (1986). 
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the very least, it is about the choice of liabilities  as well as assets), the 
connection  between  it and  the view of extraordinary  stock price  changes 
advanced  here is obviously illustrative  rather  than direct. The point is 
simply  that  conceptualizing  risk  in the way suggested  in this paper-that 
is, as consisting of an ordinary  and an extraordinary  component-can 
readily  explain  behavior  of the kind  hypothesized  by Minsky  to underlie 
the irregular  occurrence  of financial  crises with major  negative effects 
on nonfinancial  economic activity. In the highly simplified  model used 
below to demonstrate  this point, the risk  associated  with holding  stocks 
is the only form of risk considered  and hence is a metaphor  for the far 
wider range of financial  and business risks included in Minsky's rich 
descriptions. 
The paper  begins by briefly  reviewing  stock price movements  in the 
United  States, both since World  War  II and  earlier,  and  then  developing 
the  basic  representation  of stock  price  movements  in  terms  of an  ordinary 
and an extraordinary  component. The data presented show that the 
familiar  finding  of too many extreme  price movements  to fit the normal 
distribution  emerges regardless  of the period chosen. Moreover, over 
the postwar  period these extreme movements overwhelmingly  consist 
of market  crashes, not rallies. The model introduced  to represent  this 
process uses some simplifying  assumptions  to identify the magnitude 
and  timing  of the movements  that  it is possible  to regard  as extraordinary. 
As it turns  out, all of these extraordinary  movements since World  War 
II have been price declines. Further,  each of the crashes pinpointed  in 
this way is a familiar  episode in market  history, and, except for the one 
in 1987, each coincided with some independent  event that potentially 
could have caused it.  Surprisingly,  the estimated magnitude of the 
extraordinary  crash  component  is identical  in each of these episodes. 
The next section of the paper  illustrates  the implications  of this two- 
part  representation  of stock price  movements  for the question  of volatil- 
ity persistence (and, ultimately, market  efficiency). The analysis here 
relies in part  on the familiar  ARCH  model developed by Robert  Engle.6 
But it also introduces  a more robust  form of this model-MARCH (for 
"modified  ARCH")-designed specifically  for this purpose.  The result- 
ing  estimates  shed additional  light  on the time series properties  of equity 
returns,  including  in particular  the question  of persistence  of volatility. 
6.  See Engle (1982);  Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987);  and Bollerslev, Engle, and 
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The last section takes up the Minsky hypothesis to illustrate the 
relevance of extreme movements in stock prices to fluctuations in 
nonfinancial  economic  activity. Using  empirical  estimates  of the  extraor- 
dinary  component  of stock price changes analogous  to those presented 
in the first  section of the paper, the analysis shows how the behavior  of 
investors trying to allocate their portfolios as best they can, using 
whatever information  they have available at any time, can cause the 
overall  financial  system to become more  fragile  with the passing  of time 
after the most recent market crash, just as Minsky has suggested. 
Especially  in  this  context, however, it is appropriate  to question  a central 
assumption  maintained  (purely  for  convenience)  throughout  this  paper- 
specifically, that the ordinary  and extraordinary  components of stock 
price  changes  occur independently  of one another.  The paper  concludes 
with a brief  discussion of the interesting,  though  difficult  to investigate, 
possibility  that  the two may be related  in an important  way. 
Stock Returns: Ordinary and Extraordinary 
Since the end of World  War  II, the average pretax return  on stocks 
traded  in U.S. markets  has been positive in 28 years and negative in 15 
years. The average rate of return during 1946-88, measured by the 
Standard  and  Poor's 500, was 12.62  percent  a year. Compared  with 4.75 
percent  a year for Treasury  bills, the average excess return  on stocks 
during  1946-88  was 7.86 percent  a year.7 
Figure 1 plots the excess returns  on stocks over Treasury  bills for 
1946-88  using the quarterly  time unit that is standard  for most macro- 
economic analyses of the postwar era. Two features of the data stand 
out. First, in several  quarters  stock prices moved far  enough-either up 
or down-to  render the total excess return very large or very small 
compared  with the usual range of variation.8  More specifically, the 
kurtosis  of the excess returns  series is 1.41, statistically  significant  at the 
7.  All returns data are computed from Lbbotson and Associates  (1989). 
8.  Because  dividends  tend to move  so much more smoothly  than stock  prices,  the 
identification  of  extraordinary  returns and  extraordinary  price  changes,  as  implicitly 
maintained throughout this paper, is entirely legitimate.  For the post-World  War II  data 
analyzed below,  the quarterly standard deviation of the total return series for equities is 
0.0770. The standard deviations  of the underlying price change and dividend series  are 
0.0761 and 0.0036, respectively. 142  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
Figure 1.  Quarterly Excess Returns for Stocks, 1946-88a 
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Source:  lbbotson  and Associates  (1989). 
a.  Dotted  lines are drawn at distances  of two and three standard deviations  from the sample mean. 
0.01  level under  the  maintained  hypothesis  that  returns  are  independently 
drawn  from  an identical  (that  is unchanging)  normal  distribution  (i.i.d.).9 
Hence, stock returns  are leptokurtotic, meaning that the tails of the 
distribution  have too many extreme observations to fit the normal 
distribution.  The  22.6  percent  one-day  decline  in stock  prices  on October 
19, 1987,  was unique,  but  from  the perspective  of a quarterly  time  frame 
the 1987:4  episode was merely one of several unusually  large  rallies or 
crashes. 
Second, at least since World  War  II these unusually  large  movements 
have more often been crashes than  rallies. Of the eight quarters  during 
1946-88  in which the excess return  on stocks differed  from  the postwar 
mean (equal to  1.87 percent a quarter)  by more than two standard 
deviations (equal  to 15.65  percent  a quarter),  two saw positive returns 
and six negative. Moreover, the six negative excess returns  were, on 
balance, somewhat  more extreme  than  the two positive ones. The only 
two quarters  in the entire postwar period to see excess returns  more 
than  three  standard  deviations  from  the mean  were the crashes  in 1974:3 
9.  Kurtosis  statistics  are  measured  in  excess ofthree.  According  to this  standardization 
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and 1987:4.  As a result, the skewness of the entire series (which  would 
be zero if excess returns  were normally  distributed)  is - 0.68, signifi- 
cantly  different  from  zero at the 0.01 level under  the maintained  hypoth- 
esis of i.i.d. normality.  10 
U.S. stock returns  from  before World  War  II likewise exhibit lepto- 
kurtosis, although not negative skewness. Table 1 summarizes the 
relevant data by showing the first four moments of  stock returns, 
computed  not just for the postwar  period but also for various samples 
throughout  the nineteenth  and twentieth  centuries. These calculations 
rely on excess return  data  for the S&P 500 for 1926-88  and total return 
data  compiled  by William  Schwert  for 1802-1987.11 
The finding  of significant  leptokurtosis-too  many extreme  observa- 
tions to fit the normal distribution-appears regardless  of the period 
chosen. Apparently,  U.S.  stock returns  have always been subject to 
occasional  extraordinary  movements. By contrast,  the skewness of the 
series is positive, sometimes significantly  so and sometimes not, for 
periods  beginning  before  World  War  11.  12 
This historical  record  provides ample grounds  for doubts about the 
standard  representation  of stock returns  in terms of a single normally 
10. Monthly data for 1946-88 likewise exhibit leptokurtosis  (1.96) and negative 
skewness (-0.35),  where again  both are statistically  significant  at the 0.01 level. These 
statistics  cannot  be compared  directly  with  the quarterly  statistics  because  of the effect of 
aggregation.  It  is interesting,  however,  that  the  leptokurtosis  and  skewness  of the quarterly 
series are each greater  in magnitude  than  what would follow from  the leptokurtosis  and 
skewness  of the monthly  data  if months  were aggregated  into quarters  purely  at random. 
The  contrast  suggests  that  there  is some  tendency  for  individual  months  with  large  negative 
observations  to bunch  together. 
11. See Schwert  (1989).  Because the variation  of stock returns  dominates  these data, 
there  is little  difference  between  the properties  of Schwert'  s total  return  data  and  those of 
the S&P  excess return  data  for periods  in which  the two overlap. 
12. The finding  of significant  positive skewness in the 1926-88 S&P series and the 
1900-87  and 1802-1987  Schwert  series is a reflection  of two huge  rallies  during  the Great 
Depression  of the 1930s.  After  the October  1929  crash, the stock market  fell throughout 
much  of 1930,  1931,  and  the first  half  of 1932,  but  then it rallied  sharply  in the summer  of 
1932.  From  June 30 to September  30 the total return  on the S&P was 84.7 percent  (not 
annualized).  After  again  declining  later  that  year  and  in early 1933,  the market  rallied  even 
more  sharply  during  the famous  first "100 days" of the Roosevelt administration.  From 
March  31 to June 30 the market  rose 88.6 percent (again, not annualized).  These two 
positive  returns  are clearly  extreme  compared  with the remainder  of the history  of U.S. 
stock  returns.  The  next  largest  quarterly  return  on the S&P  index  during  1926-88  was 38.4 
percent,  in 1938:2,  and  the lowest return  on the S&P  index during  this period  was - 37.9 
percent,  in 1932:2  (just  before  that  year's summer  rally).  In Schwert's  data  for 1802-1925, 
the  largest  quarterly  return  was 28.7  percent,  in 1900:4,  and  the lowest  was -  19.2  percent, 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Quarterly U.S.  Stock Returns, Various Periods,  1802-1988 
Standard 
Sample  Mean  deviation  Skewness  Kurtosis 
S&P excess returnsa 
1946-88  0.0187  0.0783  -0.68b  1.41b 
1954-88  0.0170  0.0814  -0.63b  1.24b 
1926-88  0.0221  0.1232  2.16b  17.13b 
Schwert  total r  eturns 
1801-1987  0.0220  0.0893  1.68b  18.43b 
1900-1987  0.0278  0.1089  1.82b  16.46b 
1802-1899  0.0167  0.0665  0.13  1.73b 
Sources:  Data  on S&P  returns  from  Ibbotson  and  Associates  (1989),  exhibit  20. Schwert  data  from  Schwert  (1989). 
a. Excess returns  on stocks  over Treasury  bills. 
b. Significant  at 0.01 level against  the null  hypothesis  of i.i.d. normality.  No results  were significant  at the 0.10 or 
0.50 level. 
distributed  random  variable.  An alternative  that is only modestly more 
complex, and yet potentially  consistent with observed market  move- 
ments, is to represent  stock returns  as the sum of two elements:  first, in 
each quarter  a component  that is normally  distributed  with given mean 
and given variance (and neither skewness nor leptokurtosis), and, 
second, an  additional  return  component  that  is realized  only  on occasion, 
independently  of the first component, and with different mean and 
variance. 
In general, there is no reason why over time the first of these two 
components, the one present every quarter, may not exhibit serial 
correlation, time-varying  volatility (with or without persistence over 
time), or any of the other  characteristics  that have been the focus of so 
much attention  in the literature  studying  the time series properties  of 
returns  on stocks and other assets.  13 By contrast, because what makes 
the second component  relevant  in the first place is that it occurs in an 
explicitly  irregular  way over time, the underlying  motivation  of this two- 
part representation  suggests that the second component be serially 
uncorrelated. 
The implications  of this  two-part  representation  of stock  returns,  both 
for investor behavior and for consequent macroeconomic  outcomes, 
will  clearly  depend  on the  frequency  and  the pattern  over  time-actually, 
the lack of pattern over time-characterizing the appearance  of the 
13. See, for example, Bollerslev, Engle, and Woolridge  (1988);  Fama and French 
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second random  element. Those features  presumably  depend in turn  on 
the nature  of whatever  phenomenon  is behind  these occasional events. 
Are they the market's  reflection  of important  but unexpected develop- 
ments in the economic or the political sphere? Are they merely the 
bursting  of market "bubbles" of the sort that Olivier Blanchard  and 
Mark  Watson, Kenneth West, and other researchers  have shown can 
arise even when all market  participants  are fully "rational"  ?14 Or, still 
further  from any underlying  fundamentals,  do they result from what 
Robert  Shiller  has called "fads  and  fashions," pursued  by investors  who 
influence  one another  in ways that resemble  the incidence  of infectious 
disease epidemics?15  In the absence of some firm  basis for identifying 
the substantive  content of these extraordinary  events, any qualitative 
characterization  of their  occurrence  over time is bound  to be arbitrary. 
One potentially  useful device for characterizing  events that occur at 
irregular  intervals  is the Poisson  distribution.  A Poisson  random  variable 
can take on any nonnegative  integer  value. The Poisson distribution  is 
commonly  used to model  processes that  involve  a count, like the number 
of incoming  telephone calls to a switchboard  per unit of time, or the 
number  of meteorite  craters  on the surface  of a planet  per unit of area. 
A characteristic  of the Poisson distribution  that is especially important 
in the specific context of this paper is that the sum of two (or more) 
independent  Poisson variables  also has the Poisson distribution.  As a 
result, in the absence of  serial dependence, the level of  temporal 
aggregation  of any time series is irrelevant. Hence, using quarterly 
observations as in this paper-or  monthly, or annual-presents  no 
problem,  even if the true underlying  process generating  these observa- 
tions is daily  (or  hourly,  or second-by-second).  16 
14. See, for example,  Blanchard  and  Watson  (1982);  and  West  (1987). 
15. See Shiller  (1984). 
16. A further  attraction  of the Poisson  distribution  for  the purposes  of this  paper  is that 
a large  body of literature  has explored  its implications  for investor behavior  and asset 
prices,  both  theoretically  and  empirically.  Theoretical  work  on this  subject  has  emphasized 
the crucial  implications  of discrete  jumps  in asset prices  (as opposed  to smooth  diffusion 
processes)  in continuous-time  settings;  see, for example, Merton  (1971, 1976);  and Cox 
and  Ross (1976).  Examples  of empirical  applications  to equity  prices  include  Press  (1967); 
Clark  (1973);  Ball  and  Torous  (1983);  Jarrow  and  Rosenfeld  (1984);  and  Akgiray  and  Booth 
(1987).  Feinstone  (1984, 1985),  Akgiray  and Booth (1988),  and Tucker  and Pond (1988) 
have applied  the idea to foreign  exchange  rates. The specific  model used here was first 
proposed  by Press  (1967),  who applied  the model  to the returns  of individual  stocks from 
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In general,  the Poisson distribution  could also characterize  a process 
exhibiting  serial dependence  (the annual  number  of volcanic eruptions 
on Hawaii  could be modeled  as an autocorrelated  Poisson process), in 
which  case the level of temporal  aggregation  would  no longer  be flexible. 
The model  of stock market  crashes  presented  below, however, assumes 
serial independence-that is, that the number  of crashes in any given 
quarter  is independent  of the number  of crashes in the previous  quarter. 
The  fact  that  the market  crashed  in late 1987,  for  example,  made  a second 
crash  in early 1988  neither  more nor less likely than  it would have been 
if the market  had  rallied  continuously  throughout  1987. 
With the assumption  of a serially independent  Poisson distribution 
for the timing  of the occasional  component,  a two-component  represen- 
tation  of stock returns  is then 
(1)  =it+v,t 
(2, 
(2)  Et - N,  vi, 
(3) 
i=O 
(4)  tYj  N(ql,, r2), 
(5)  m,  -  P(A), 
where P,  is the excess return  on stocks in time period t; E is the once- 
per-period  realization  of a disturbance  distributed  normally,  with mean 
1i and variance  c2o;  Qt  iS  the sum of m,t  realizations  of PY,  a disturbance 
distributed  normally  with mean  ip  and variance  c2;  m, is the once-per- 
period  observation  from  a Poisson  process  with  characteristic  parameter 
X  (equal  to the expected value of m,t);  and  -  indicates  random  variables. 
(Writing  the means  and  variances  of the two normal  distributions  without 
subscripts, thereby indicating constancy over time, is a simplifying 
assumption  to be examined  more carefully  below.) Hence r,, which is 
observable,  is the sum  of (1 + m,t)  elements,  each of which  is individually 
unobservable  and  each of which is distributed  normally.  17 
Previous work with models along these lines, using high-frequency 
currency  and equity returns,  has resulted  in large estimated  values for 
17. Thinking  of the model in this way motivates its representation  as a mixture  of 
normals:  r, - N[[  +  (m,  4O),  U(  +  (m,  i  2)],  with  m, - P(x). Benjamin M. Friedman and David I. Laibson  147 
the X  parameter,  implying  that any given observed return  is likely to be 
composed  of , and  many  realizations  of Yi.  By contrast,  the intuition  of 
extraordinary  events that occur only occasionally corresponds  to the 
case in which X is small-substantially less than unity-so  that m-  , is 
typically zero and Pt  usually consists  merely of  ,.  With X  small, rm,  =  1 
at irregular  intervals-approximately once every 1/A  periods on aver- 
age-so  that  Pt  only rarely  consists of e plus  a realization  of 'i.  18  Multiple 
realizations  of PYi  (that  is, values of ,tt greater  than  one) are  also possible, 
albeit  unlikely. 
With X  small, the representation  of stock returns  given in equations 
1-5 is potentially  consistent with the pattern  shown in figure 1-or,  for 
that matter,  with any of a variety of familiar  intuitive  characterizations 
involving  occasional market  crashes like that of October 1987. Lepto- 
kurtosis  without  skewness corresponds  to a large  variance  uo  (compared 
with ur).  Negative skewness corresponds  to a negative mean ip.  The 
combination  of kurtosis and skewness that is apparent  in figure 1 can 
result  from  ip < 0 and  large  uo  , or merely  from  a large  enough  (in  absolute 
values)  if even if uc is small.  Indeed, the familiar  postwar  notion  that  the 
market  is subject  to occasional crashes, without  any analogous  discon- 
tinuities  in the upward  direction,  corresponds  to a large  negative  ip with 
small c2. 
Estimating the model in equations 1-5 involves maximizing the 
appropriate  likelihood  function (see the appendix)  with respect to the 
five parameters  pl, or2,  i,  2,  and X. Carrying  out this estimation  using 
S&P  500  quarterly  excess returns  spanning  1954-88  results  in a "border 
solution" in which the estimated value of  o2  (the variance of the 
extraordinary  disturbance)  is zero.19  Estimating  the model's other four 
parameters  subject  to the constraint  U2 = 0 leads  to the following  results, 
18. Under the assumption of  serial independence, these intervals are explicitly 
irregular, in that mi, =  1  is no more (or less) likely if m,  , =  1  than if m,  , = 0. 
19. The model  is obviously  undefined  for  (o2 < 0.  Having  the sample  begin  in 1954, as 
is the practice  in many  macroeconomic  models  of the United  States, is a way of excluding 
not only the World  War  II and Korean  War  periods  but  also the intervening  years during 
which  monetary  policy  still  operated  under  a formal  wartime  commitment  to peg the price 
of U.S. government  securities.  The  presumption  is that  the 1951  Treasury-Federal  Reserve 
Accord,  which  freed  monetary  policy  from  this restriction,  changed  the behavior  of asset 
markets  in an  important  way. This  assumption  is particularly  relevant  in the context  of the 
model  developed  below,  in which  market  participants  attempt  to learn  about  the stochastic 
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where 
A  signifies a maximum  likelihood estimate and the numbers in 
parentheses  are asymptotic  t-statistics: 
=  0.0246, 
(3.9) 
=  0.0048, 
(6)  (7.7) 
=  0.2333, 
(5.0) 
A 
X =  0.0327. 
(1.7) 
This set of values immediately  corresponds  to the intuitive  notion of 
an ordinary  level of market  risk, represented  by an ongoing once-per- 
period  normally  distributed  disturbance,  punctuated  by occasional  mar- 
ket crashes. The random component realized once per period has 
estimated  mean 2.46 percent (per quarter)  and standard  deviation 6.93 
percent.  The occasional  crash  element, by contrast,  has estimated  mean 
- 23.33 percent (again,  per quarter)  with zero variance.  The estimated 
frequency  of such crashes is once every 30.6 quarters  -  that is, about 
every eight  years on average. 
Conditioning  on the estimated  parameter  values reported  above (and 
with  2 =  0), corresponding estimates  of  Et,  vt,  and m, in each quarter 
follow from maximizing  the likelihood  function (see appendix)  in each 
period with respect to the (nonnegative integer) value of m,. These 
conditional  estimates  will be denoted  with t's. The estimated  values mt 
are  all zero with the exception  of four  quarters  -  1962:2,  1970:2,  1974:3, 
and  1987:4  -in  which  mI  is unity.20  These  four  specific  quarters  identified 
as realizations  of the crash process (mt =  1) are all familiar  historical 
episodes. In traditional  market  lore, 1962:2  corresponds  to the Kennedy 
administration's  battle with the steel industry;  1970:2  to tight  monetary 
policy (what was regarded  at the time as a "credit crunch") and the 
default  of Penn Central;  and 1974:3  to some combination  of the OPEC 
price  rise, tight  monetary  policy aimed  at resisting  the resulting  inflation, 
the consequent deepening recession, the escalation of the Watergate 
scandal  culminating  in the resignation  of President  Nixon, the failure  of 
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Franklin  National  Bank, and, in some versions, even the U.S. invasion 
of Cambodia.  Subsequent  history may also come to associate 1987:4 
with some analogous  events as well. From the perspective of the data 
alone, reference  to figure  1 makes clear that the estimation  has simply 
picked out the four observations  primarily  responsible  for the negative 
skewness and  leptokurtosis  of the excess return  series. 
With  these four observations  tempered  by removal  of the nonzero v,t 
realizations,  the remaining  component  of rt  -  that  is the et series  defined 
by  I = rt -  m  - -  has noticeably  different  statistical  properties  from 
those of r, itself. The skewness and kurtosis that strongly indicate 
nonnormality  of the r, in figure 1 simply do not appear  in the c,  series. 
The skewness  of t  is 0.06, slightly  positive but  in any case not significant 
at any plausible  level. The kurtosis  value is - 0.28, slightly  negative but 
again  not significant  at any plausible  level. The contrast  to the rt  series 
in these respects is hardly  surprising,  in that 1974:3  and 1987:4  are the 
only observations of rt more than three standard  deviations from the 
mean,  while 1962:2  and 1970:2  are  the only others  more  than  2.5 standard 
deviations from the mean. The 4,I series, which has mt  =  23.33 
removed  from  each of these four  observations,  is clearly  more symmet- 
rical  and  contains  fewer observations  in its tails. 
Does Market Volatility Persist? 
This two-part  representation  of stock returns, which separates out 
the very large  movements  that occur only rarely, has interesting  impli- 
cations  for  several  long-standing  questions  about  the  time  series  behavior 
of these returns. 
For example, a long-standing  issue in research bearing  on whether 
the stock market is efficient, in the sense that prices always fully 
incorporate  all available  information,  is whether  either  prices or returns 
are serially  correlated.21  Performing  a simple  first-order  autoregression 
using  the  r,  series  plotted  in  figure  1  for 1954-88  yields  the  usual  extremely 
weak evidence of serial correlation  in stock returns  shown in the first 
row of table 2. The coefficient  on the lagged  return  is barely significant 
21. See, for example, Fama and French's (1988) return  regressions, Poterba and 
Summers's  (1988)  work  on mean  reversion,  and  the references  cited in these papers.  The 
basic  reference  describing  the movement  of speculative  asset prices  in an efficient  market 
is Samuelson  (1965). b  X  o X~~~~~~0  m  0 
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at the 0.10 level. Higher-order  autoregressions  (not shown in the table) 
yield similar  results. By contrast,  analogous  tests based on the ordinary 
component  of the  variation  of stock  returns,  represented  by the  estimated 
4t,  values from equations 1-5, provide quite different  results. The esti- 
mated value of the coefficient on the lagged ordinary  return  element 
shown in the second row of table 2 is larger  than that for the observed 
total return, and it is easily significant  at the 0.05 level. Indeed, the 
t-statistic is just short of the critical value for the 0.01 level. Again, 
higher-order  autoregressions  (not shown)  yield similar  results. 
A question that has received even more attention in recent stock 
market research is that of time-varying  volatility, together with the 
related  issue of whether "volatility shocks" themselves exhibit persis- 
tence over time-in  other words, whether  an interval  of unusually  high 
variance  in returns  is typically followed by high variance, or whether 
high-variance  periods tend to occur purely at random.  Like the serial 
correlation  issue, the debate about volatility  persistence is interesting, 
ultimately,  because it bears  on the efficiency  of stock prices  in reflecting 
available  information  and, consequently, on the efficiency of the stock 
market  mechanism  in allocating scarce capital. In addition, complex 
patterns  of time-varying  volatility may help to explain the finding  of 
autocorrelated  returns. 
As the results reported  in the third  and fourth  rows of table 2 show, 
simple  first-order  autoregressions  of squared  deviations  of excess stock 
returns  from the corresponding  mean show no evidence of volatility 
persistence regardless  of whether the variable  under study is the ob- 
served return  rt  or the estimated  ordinary  component  4t. Second-order 
autoregressions  tell a different  story, however. The second-order  auto- 
regression  for squared  deviations  of rt  from  its mean,  reported  in the fifth 
row, yields the more familiar  modest evidence that volatility is in fact 
persistent.  Coefficient  P2 is easily significant  at the 0.10 level and  almost 
so at the 0.05 level. By contrast, in the same autoregression  based on 
squared  deviations  of  t from its mean, reported  in the last row,  2  iS 
significant  at the 0.01 level. Autoregressions  of order higher  than two 
(not shown) echo these respective results. While the evidence for 
persistence  of volatility in observed stock returns  is weak, therefore, 
use of a two-part  representation  of returns,  as in equations 1-5 above, 
provides a much stronger basis for inferring  that there is volatility 
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Naive autoregressions  like those reported  in table 2, however, are a 
crude way to investigate issues like persistence in volatility of asset 
returns.  A more attractive  approach,  which models time-varying  vari- 
ances in an explicit  way, is the autoregressive  conditional  heteroskedas- 
ticity (ARCH) model developed by Robert Engle and subsequently 
generalized  along several dimensions  by Engle and various coauthors. 
The essence of this approach  as applied  to the excess return  on a risky 
asset like stocks is to combine some simple  asset-pricing  model, which 
relates  the excess return  to the level of risk  perceived  by investors, with 
an explicitly time-varying  representation  of that perceived risk, at any 
point  in time, in terms  of the observed  history  of market  volatility  up to 
that  point. 
For example, the standard  one-period  capital  asset pricing  model  for 
a single  risky  asset is 
(7)  Pt  = Pa(Jt  tt-I  +  11, 
where Pt  is again the excess return  on stocks compared  with Treasury 
bills (treated  here  as a risk-free  asset), p  is the market-average  coefficient 
of relative  risk  aversion,  at is the perceived  variance  of the excess return 
(conditioned on all information then available),  ott- 1 is the share of the 
total market  portfolio  consisting  of the risky asset, and at  is a normally 
distributed  disturbance term.22  A  standard "GARCH" (generalized 
ARCH) representation  of the evolution over time of the perceived 
variance is in turn 
(8)  at=  K  +  0U  I  Ut  2I 
where ua-  1  is the estimated  value of the disturbance  in equation  7-that 
is,  the "surprise" in the return on the risky asset-in  the previous 
period.23  Apart  from the constant  K,  the variance of the excess return 
22. Although  the usual capital  asset pricing  model includes no constant  term, other 
researchers-for example, Bollerslev, Engle, and Woolridge  (1988)-have often added 
one. Estimation  results  for models  equivalent  to equations  7-8, and equation  7 together 
with  equation  9 below,  never  provided  evidence  for  a constant  in  equation  7 at  any  plausible 
significance  level. All results  reported  in this paper  are for equation  7 as written,  with no 
constant. 
23. More  general  GARCH  equations  could include  any number  of lags of 62 and a . 
Indeed, several lags would be needed to reproduce  precisely the unusual pattern  of 
volatility  autocorrelations  implied  by the regressions  discussed  above. Following  earlier 
research,  however, the GARCH  model considered  here is constrained  to represent  the 
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on equities (which is conditional  on the information  available at the 
outset of each period) therefore depends on the previous period's 
"surprise,"  weighted  by 0, and  on the  perceived  variance  as ofthe outset 
of the previous  period,  weighted  by +. Depending  on the values of 0 and 
+, the perceived  variance  can move smoothly  or not over time, and can 
exhibit  strong  or weak persistence, or none at all. 
The first two rows of table 3 summarize  the results of estimating 
equations  7 and 8 jointly by maximum  likelihood methods, using the 
same quarterly  time series spanning 1954-88, first for the observed 
excess return on stocks rt, and then for the ordinary  component 4t 
estimated  above.24  There  are  two conceptually  different  ways of inferring 
persistence  of stock return  volatility  from the estimated  parameters  of 
equation  8, and  in both cases the values shown in the second row based 
on the 4,1 series indicate greater persistence than the corresponding 
values in the first  row based on rt. 
First, if equation 8 describes the actual evolution over time of the 
variance  of ft (which  is equal  to the conditional  variance  of r,), then the 
at that equation 8 determines  for each period is not just the variance 
perceived by investors but the actual variance as well. In that case a 
large  positive or negative  realization  of at  results in the variance  of at, I 
increasing,  so that  the persistence  of volatility  of returns  depends  on the 
sum (0+ 4).  In particular,  when the sum (0+ 4) is close to one, the 
increase  or decrease in variance  resulting  from any given realization  of 
ft tends to die out slowly over time, while (0 + 4) near  zero implies  that 
any such  increase  or decrease  will tend to disappear  quickly.25  Compar- 
ison of the first  and second rows in table 3 shows a modest  difference  in 
this respect, with (0  + q)  =  0.83 based on rt, as against  (0 + 4)  =  0.87 
based  on 4. In the aftermath  of any given realization  of ft that  increases 
the variance,  therefore,  the expectation  is that after  four quarters  only 
48 percent  of that  increase  will remain  according  to the results  based on 
rt,  as against  57 percent  according  to the results  based on ct7. 
24. The  data  for the asset shares  are calculated  from  the Flow of Funds  balance  sheet 
data  for the household  sector. Maximization  of the likelihood  function  was achieved  by 
applying  numerical  derivatives  to the quadratic  hill-climbing  algorithm  from  the GQOPT 
Microsoft  Fortran  library. 
25. On the assumption  that Cr2 =  &2 , expected volatility can be expressed by the 
recursion 
E[cr+1]  =  K  +  (0  +  *E[C2],  where s -  t. 
This  implies  that  shocks  to volatility  decay  geometrically  at rate  (0 + 4. 154  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Table 3.  Results for CAPM-GARCH and CAPM-MARCH Modelsa 
Independent 
Model  variable  K  6 
GARCH  r,  6. 19b  0.0014c  0.3057  0.5287b  .  .  . 
(3.0)  (1.7)  (1.6)  (4.0) 
GARCH  t  10.89b  0.0007  0.2200d  0.6471b  .  .  . 
(3.9)  (1.5)  (2.0)  (5.3) 
MARCH  r,  7.78b  0.0003  0.0084  0.6147b  67.00 
(3.7)  (0.7)  (1.5)  (5.7)  (1.5) 
a.  Asymptotic  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Sample period is 1954-88.  Capital asset  price model with generalized 
(GARCH) and modified (MARCH) ARCH models. 
CAPM:  yt  =  Pa&t, -  + Ut, 
GARCH:  &I  =  K  +  0(Ui-  1)  +  +  &JI 
MARCH:  &I  =  K  +  0 F[ii_  l] + 4 &J- 
fsin[a.iW  l]  if  a  iWj < - 
F[iI]  =  2 
1  if  a-aui  --2. 
2 
b.  Significant at 0.01  level. 
c.  Significant at 0.10 level. 
d.  Significant at 0.05 level. 
Alternatively,  equation  8 could merely describe how investors form 
their perceptions of the variance of the risky asset's return, without 
necessarily implying  that the actual variance evolves in that way (or 
even that  it changes  at all). In this context equation  8 can be interpreted 
as the familiar "error-learning"  equation, which is  not necessarily 
optimal.26  For example,  if the underlying  distribution  of returns  actually 
has a constant conditional variance, but investors nevertheless use 
equation  8 to form their forecasts, then a large realized squared  "sur- 
prise" uti 1 raises the perceived variance  at but does not affect the true 
mathematical  expectation of the future value ut.27 Hence, a shock to 
investors' perceived volatility will on average decay geometrically  at 
rate +  rather  than rate (0 + 4o).28  In this case the difference  in implied 
26. Muth  (1960)  derives  the conditions  under  which  an error-learning  equation  repre- 
sents  an optimal  forecast  procedure.  Meiselman  (1963)  is a standard  reference  for an early 
application  of the error-learning  model  to investor  behavior.  In most  applications,  the two 
weights  (here  0 and 4) sum to unity, and the equation  does not contain  a constant  term. 
As table  3 shows, the sum of estimated  values  0 and 4 is close to unity, but the constant 
term  has nonzero  value. 
27. This  will be exactly  true  only if a, = r, -  E[r,]. 
28. On the assumption  that the conditional  variance  Cr2 is equal  to some constant  Cr2, 
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persistence  is even greater,  with +  =  0.53 in the results based on r, as 
against  +  =  0.65 based on  t. Four quarters  after  any given increase in 
perceived variance, due to an unusually large positive or negative 
realization  of ut,  the amount  of that  increase  that  will remain  on average 
is therefore  only 8 percent  according  to the results  based on rt,  as against 
18  percent  according  to those based on ctt. 
Hence the implication  of separating  stock returns  into ordinary  and 
extraordinary  components  is the same  regardless  of whether  the method 
used is a simple autoregression  or a more sophisticated  ARCH model 
with  either  of the interpretations  offered  above. In all cases the evidence 
for  persistence  is greater  for the ordinary,  every-period  component  than 
it is for the total return  consisting of both the ordinary  component  and 
the occasional  extraordinary  shock. 
Results like those presented  in tables 2 and 3 are interesting  for the 
light  that  they shed on the behavior  of the ordinary  component  of stock 
returns, given the prior exclusion of the extraordinary  component as 
estimated  using the model in equations 1-5. Nevertheless, because the 
form  of equations  1-5 estimated  here allows neither  for serial  correlation 
of the ordinary  component  Et  nor for variation  over time of its variance 
a? (or variance  o2 either,  for that  matter),  there  is a tension between the 
procedure  used to isolate the estimated  Et  series and the analysis to 
which it is then subjected.  One way to resolve this tension would be to 
use a procedure  like that developed by Christopher  Sims to generalize 
equations 1-5 so as to allow for serial correlation  and a time-varying 
variance.29  The  alternative  suggested  immediately  below avoids  the need 
for prior  separation  of the ordinary  and extraordinary  components of 
returns,  by modifying  the basic ARCH  model itself to make  it robust  to 
"outlier"  events. In particular,  the point of such a modified  model  is to 
enable the ARCH mechanism  to focus on the ordinary  component of 
stock returns  by deemphasizing  the extraordinary  events that  appear  to 
operate  outside  of the ARCH  context. 
perception  &a,,  the mathematical  expectation  of perceived  volatility  can be expressed  by 
the recursion 
E[&',+1] =  K  +  0  *Ocr+ +  .E[&2],  where  s S  t. 
This  implies  that  shocks  to perceived  volatility  will decay  geometrically  at rate  P. 
29. See Sims  (1989).  In related  work  we are attempting  to implement  this alternative 
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To motivate such a modification,  it is useful to recall the basic idea 
underlying  the separation  of stock returns  into ordinary  and extraordi- 
nary components in the first place: namely, the repeated finding  that 
observed  returns  include occaslonal very large shocks-not  many, but 
too many to be consistent with the once-per-period  observation of a 
single, normally  distributed  random  variable.  If these occasional large 
movements  stem from something  separate  from the ordinary  forces at 
work in the market  all the time, then they should not affect the future 
volatility  of the ordinary  element  of returns.  Applying  the conventional 
ARCH  model to the ordinary  component  only, as above, is one way to 
represent  this process. But doing so requires  some prior way of distin- 
guishing  the ordinary  and  extraordinary  components.  The objective  of a 
modified  ARCH model in this context is to avoid that requirement.  In 
particular,  the modified  model, to be estimated  using observed returns, 
should disregard (or at least deemphasize) any part of a quarter's 
observed  return  that  is likely to reflect  an extraordinary  event. 
In its most general form, the modified  ARCH model ("MARCH") 
corresponding  to equation  8 is just 
(9)  at  =  K +0  F[Ut_  1]  I 
where F[ ] can, in general,  be any function  that  transforms  the previous 
quarter's  surprise  before  it affects  the current  quarter's  conditional  risk. 
The third  row of table 3 shows the result of estimating,  again  using the 
observed quarterly  return  series for 1954-88, the MARCH  model con- 
sisting  of equations  7 and 9 where F[ ] is a truncated  sine curve, 
^2  2~~-  (sin [a * U2_ 1]  if  a *  2  <2 
(10)  F[ui  a2  ,< 
if  ai4  2~  t1  if  a * ~~~Ut-1  I  2  9 
with a >  0.30  Because the GARCH  model in equation  9 is just a special 
case of the MARCH  model in equation 10, it is appropriate  to apply a 
likelihood  ratio test of GARCH  against  the MARCH  alternative.3'  The 
30. An alternative  candidate  for F[-]  is the truncated  quadratic  function.  For purposes 
of the model  presented  in this paper,  results  based  on the truncated  sine function  and  the 
truncated  quadratic  function  are  indistinguishable. 
31. The GARCH  model can be approximated  arbitrarily  closely with the MARCH 
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test clearly favors MARCH  over GARCH. The relevant x2 statistic is 
4.54, easily large  enough  to warrant  rejecting  the GARCH  model  in favor 
of MARCH  at the 0.05 level. 
Because the effect that any observed surprise  exerts on perceived 
risk  in the MARCH  model  depends  on the interaction  of 0 and  a (and  on 
the sine  function),  it is difficult  to compare  the respective  impact  implied 
by the GARCH  and  MARCH  models  merely  by inspecting  the estimated 
parameter  values  shown  in  table  3. Figure  2 provides  a visual  comparison 
of the MARCH  model with 0 = 0.0084 and a  =  67 (from  the third  row 
of table  3) and  the GARCH  model  with 0 = 0.31 (from  the first  row). For 
each model, figure 2 plots the impact on the perceived variance at 
resulting  from  a prior-period  surprise  u2_  I of any given magnitude.  For 
purposes  of comparison,  the figure  also includes  a  450 line corresponding 
to the special case of a GARCH  model with 0= 1. The GARCH  model 
line is simply  a straight  line with slope given by 0 = 0.31. By contrast, 
the MARCH model line rises more rapidly at first, implying a  "0 
equivalent" substantially  greater than 0.31 for small surprises. The 
sine function  reaches  a maximum  at  '2  =  0.0234  (it_  =  ?  15.3 
percent), however, after which any marginal  increment is implicitly 
presumed  to reflect  only extraordinary  (nonpersistent)  volatility,  so that 
it does not affect the variance for the next period. By contrast, the 
GARCH  model  continues  to weight  all squared  surprises,  no matter  how 
large,  in a strict  linear  manner.  For surprises  greater  than  u2_  I  = 0.0275 
ut_  I =  + 16.6 percent), the effect on ot is greater  under  the GARCH 
model,  and  thereafter  the difference  grows linearly. 
The great  majority  of the residuals,  for either model, lie well within 
the 0 S  u2_  0.0275  range  for  which  the MARCH  model  implies  greater 
impact  on the conditional  variance  in any  given  period  due  to the surprise 
in the previous period. Only seven observations-the  same ones that 
stand  out in figure  1-generate u2_  I >  0.0275. In essence, therefore,  the 
estimated  MARCH  model  is doing  what  it  is intended  to do:  distinguishing 
the extraordinary  movements and removing  most of their impact, and 
then analyzing  the persistence in volatility of the remaining  ordinary 
component. 
Like the results shown in the second row for the GARCH model 
estimated  using  the  St  series, the MARCH  model  estimates-notjust  for 
0 and a, as illustrated  in figure  2, but for +  as well-have  important 
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Figure 2.  Impact of Prior-Period Surprise 
(u2_, 
) on Perceived Variance of Return (aj-)a 
Impact  on perceived 
variance  of return  (Cr  2) 
0.035 
45-degree  line 
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0.020  - 
GARCH  line 
0.0  15 
0.010 
MARCH  line 
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0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.10 
Squared  surprise  in prior-period  return  (u2-) 
a.  See  equations  for variance in table 3. 
MARCH  framework  implies that the rate of decay of a volatility shock 
depends  on the magnitude  and  sign  of that  shock. Numerical  simulations 
of the two models show the extent to which the MARCH  model  implies 
greater persistence  of positive volatility  shocks of ordinary  magnitude, 
but less  persistence of extraordinarily  large volatility shocks.32 For 
example,  in  the  event  of a surprise  that  immediately  raises  the conditional 
variance 15  percent above its unconditional  mean, the MARCH  model 
implies that the current expectation of the conditional variance four 
quarters  in the future  is still 12.9  percent  above the unconditional  mean 
while under  the GARCH  model it is just 7.3 percent above. Similarly, 
after eight quarters  the comparison  is 7.8 percent under MARCH, as 
32. Since there is no available  analytic solution for the MARCH  model, the data 
reported here were computed using Monte Carlo methods. For each value of ro,  1,000,000 
iterations  of the stochastic  sequence  (d2,j2,  .  .  .,  &2.)  were generated  to determine  the 
expected conditional  mean  for each Cr2,  t  =  1, 2, . . .,  20, following  any given assumed 
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against  just 3.5 percent  under  GARCH.  By contrast,  in the aftermath  of 
a surprise  that immediately  raises the conditional  variance  400 percent 
above  the unconditional  mean,  the current  expectation  of the conditional 
variance four quarters  in the future is still 193.9 percent above the 
unconditional  mean under the GARCH model but only 114.9 percent 
under  the MARCH  model. After  eight quarters,  the analogous  compar- 
ison is 94.0 percent  under  GARCH, as against  only 46.7 percent under 
MARCH.33 
The MARCH  model estimates therefore imply that extremely high 
volatility  levels (like that at the time of the October 1987  crash) decay 
relatively quickly, while only marginally  high volatility levels decay 
much more slowly. This interesting  nonlinearity  is at the heart of the 
motivation  for the MARCH model, and it can potentially explain the 
consistent  failure  of past research  to find  long-term  volatility  persistence 
in stock returns.34  If returns  are in fact generated  by a process like the 
MARCH  model, naive  volatility  autoregressions  will not  pick  up  the rich 
nonlinear  pattern  of serial dependence. Moreover, since least-squares 
regressions  tend to be dominated  by outlier  observations,  the pattern  of 
weak persistence that describes the large volatility shocks will over- 
whelm the stronger  persistence of low-level shocks. In addition, this 
problem  is not specific  to the MARCH  framework.  Indeed, any compo- 
nent  process in which  the respective  volatilities  of the components  have 
different  persistence  properties  is subject  to the same difficulty. 
In sum, the results based on the new MARCH  model, which trans- 
forms  the observed surprises  within  the estimation, support  the earlier 
findings  based on the use of an independent  procedure  to distinguish 
extraordinary  observations  ex ante. Once again, effectively removing 
the impact  of large  shocks provides  greater  evidence that at least some 
movements  of stock return  volatility  over time do exhibit  relatively  high 
persistence. 
33. The interpretation  pursued  in this paragraph  assumes U2  =  &2 . Alternatively,  one 
could  assume  that  the conditional  distribution  of a2  is constant  for all t, but investors  do 
not  know  this  value  and  use equation  9 to form  their  one-period-ahead  volatility  perception 
crc. This approach  echoes the second interpretation  proposed above for the GARCH 
equation,  and  once again  this approach  implies  that shocks to perceived  volatility  will on 
average  decay  geometrically  at rate  +. Finally,  because  the MARCH  estimate  of + (0.61) 
is greater  than  the GARCH  estimate  of + (0.53),  the interpretation  proposed  here implies 
that the MARCH  model exhibits relatively  greater  persistence in shocks of perceived 
volatility. 
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Market Fluctuations  and Macroeconomic  Fluctuations 
Extraordinary  movements in stock prices are interesting in more 
respects than for the light they shed on questions like how the risk of 
investing in stocks changes over time or whether the stock market  is 
efficient.  A long tradition  has also associated financial  crises, including 
sharp  declines in stock prices, with subsequent  declines in macroeco- 
nomic  activity.35  Indeed,  when  the U.S. stock market  crashed  in October 
1987, much of the reaction in both popular and professional circles 
focused on the potential parallel to the October 1929 crash and the 
depression  of the early 1930s. 
Any theory  of business  fluctuations  that  assigns  a central  role to stock 
market  crashes  in bringing  about  economic  downturns  must  address  two 
questions.  First, why would a decline in stock prices  lead to a decline in 
real  economic  activity?  And second, what  causes the stock market  itself 
to crash?  Standard  economic theory  has had  a fair  amount  to say on the 
first  question,  beginning  with wealth effects on consumer  spending  and 
cost-of-capital  effects on business  investment,  continuing  through  credit 
rationing  effects due to loss of collateral  value, and finally  including  the 
effects of breakdown  in one or more parts  of the market  mechanism  (a 
collapse  of the banking  system, for example, or the cessation of trading 
in stocks or other  assets). By contrast,  standard  economics  has had  little 
to say about  what  causes the market  to crash  in the first  place. 
A prominent  exception to the silence is the "financial  instability 
hypothesis"  advanced  by Hyman  Minsky.  Minsky  has not attempted  to 
account for market  fluctuations  with any precision, of course, nor to 
predict  future  fluctuations.  But he has argued  that there is something 
systematic about the occurrence of stock market crashes and other 
financial  crises. In particular,  the central  tenet of Minsky's hypothesis 
is that as the most recent such crisis becomes a more distant  memory, 
the relevant  actors in the economy change  their  behavior  so as to erode 
the financial  system's ability  to withstand  a major  shock  without  sustain- 
ing a rupture  of the kind  typically  associated with a severe downturn  in 
real output and spending. For a given likelihood of such a shock's 
occurring, therefore, a financial  crisis-and  following that, a severe 
decline in economic activity-becomes  more  likely as time passes. 
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Even a casual  reading  of Minsky's  repeated  descriptions  of this idea 
immediately  shows that  the  financial  instability  hypothesis  encompasses 
a range  of financial  and  economic activities  far broader  than  merely  the 
willingness to invest in stocks. Although both Minsky and Charles 
Kindleberger  have emphasized  the role of speculative  investment  as a 
precursor  to most if not all financial  crises, their  writings  make  clear  that 
the assets on which people have speculated  at such times include not 
just publicly  traded  corporate  equities  but  also illiquid  business  interests, 
real  estate, land,  and  even collectibles. Further,  Minsky's  own work  has 
placed more emphasis on liabilities than on assets.  In most of his 
descriptions,  the phenomenon  mainly  responsible  for the deterioration 
over time of the economy's ability  to withstand  an adverse shock is the 
increasing  prevalence of "speculative" and even "Ponzi" finance, in 
preference  to "hedge" finance.36  A shock that causes cash flows to be 
insufficient  to service debts therefore  leads overextended  borrowers  to 
sell assets to meet their  obligations-as Minsky  has often put  it, "selling 
position  in  order  to make  position' -and  hence  contributes  to the  decline 
in asset values (including  stock prices) that is perhaps  the most visible 
characteristic  of financial  crises. 
Intriguing  as this  hypothesis  may  be, and  notwithstanding  the richness 
of Minsky's descriptions,  its behavioral  underpinnings  have remained 
vague. The hypothesis clearly requires that some people, or some 
institutions, change their actions in ways that reduce the financial 
system's ability  to withstand  shocks. But why do they do so? 
With the addition of one crucial ingredient-in  particular,  the as- 
sumption  that people learn over time, having incomplete information 
but using observations  on past market  movements to do the best job 
they can to discern  important  features  of the relevant  financial  environ- 
ment-the view  developed  here  of stock  market  fluctuations  as consisting 
of both an ordinary once-per-period  component and an occasional 
extraordinary  component  can provide a behavioral  motivation  for the 
pattern  of changes  suggested  by Minsky.  Specifically,  when  stock  returns 
have such a two-component  form, people who learn over time in this 
36. In Minsky's  terminology,  "hedge  finance"  means  borrowing  for purposes  with a 
high  probability  of generating  adequate  cash flow  to service the debt  in all future  periods; 
"speculative  finance"  means  borrowing  for purposes  with  a high  probability  of providing 
adequate  cash flow to service the debt after some time though  not initially,  albeit with 
positive  expected  net present  value;  and "Ponzi  finance"  means  borrowing  for purposes 
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way will become more willing  to hold stocks, and correspondingly  less 
willing  to hold "safe" assets, as time passes following  the most recent 
financial  crisis. To be sure, in this stripped-down  context with no risky 
assets other than stocks, and no liabilities  at all, investors' willingness 
to hold  stocks can at best stand  as a metaphor  for the public's  willingness 
more generally to speculate on other assets and to assume extended 
liability positions. Elaborating  a richer model, including other risky 
assets as well as liabilities, would clearly bring the analysis closer to 
Minsky's  statements  of the financial  instability  hypothesis.  But  even the 
simplest  model  involving  merely  the choice between  stocks and  a "safe" 
asset is sufficient  to show how the two-component  structure  of market 
risk suggested here can motivate the kind of change in behavior over 
time  that  is necessary  for Minsky's  hypothesis. 
An extremely  simple  prototype  model along  these lines could rest on 
the following  four  assumptions. 
First, participants in the financial markets allocate their wealth 
between two assets, stocks and Treasury  bills (taken to be free of all 
risk). 
Second, market  participants  are risk  averse. In each time period  they 
choose portfolios  to maximize  a mean-variance  utility  function  charac- 
terized by constant "price of variance" p/2 (where, under  appropriate 
assumptions  about the nature  of the uncertainty,  p is equivalent  to the 
coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion). 
Third,  market  participants  believe that stock returns  consist of both 
an ordinary  component,  distributed  normally  (mean  pL,  variance  C2) and 
realized  in each period, and an extraordinary  component,  of magnitude 
4, realized in some but not all periods. The probability  of any given 
neriod's  return  containing  an extraordinarv  element  is n.37 
37. This  formulation  is a special  case of the Poisson  model, equations  1-5, presented 
above. In particular,  as the parameter  X  goes to zero, the Poisson model is increasingly 
closely approximated  by the model  outlined  here.  This  formulation  simplifies  the Poisson 
model, in that it precludes  multiple  occurrences  of the extraordinary  return  component 
(none of which were estimated  to have occurred  in the results presented  above). The 
simpler  formulation  is more tractable  in the context of the portfolio  allocation  problem 
below. In addition,  for some of the sample  periods  for which moving-sample  results  are 
presented  below,  the Poisson  model  resulted  in  multiple  maxima  of the  likelihood  function. 
The model  used here  is also related  to, but simpler  than,  the Markov  models  proposed  by 
Reitz  (1988)  and  Cecchetti,  Lam,  and  Mark  (1989).  It  is also  related  to the  work  of Blanchard 
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Finally, market participants  believe that they know the values of 
parameters  R  and  U2 describing  the component  of stock returns  that  they 
observe  in every period,  but  do not know  the values of parameters  4 and 
p  representing  the magnitude and probability of occurrence of the 
extraordinary  component.  After each new observation  of returns,  they 
therefore  estimate  4 and  p using  all available  information  and then base 
their  portfolio  choice for  the next period  on the resulting  point  estimates. 
Whether  the model  that  market  participants  believe is correct  or not, 
it  is likely  that  over  a long  enough  time  their  estimates  of these  parameters 
will tend to converge, and after this point no basis will remain for 
motivating  changes in their behavior  from this source. Any reading  of 
the literature  of empirical  economics immediately  suggests, however, 
that  economists  do not study  the economy as if the models  that  they are 
estimating  had  never  changed.  There  is little  reason  to think  that  financial 
market  participants  do so either. The most familiar  approach  is to base 
empirical  analyses on data beginning  only after some distinct event 
believed  on a priori  grounds  to have changed  the behavior  under  study. 
Familiar  examples  include  the founding  of the Federal  Reserve System, 
World  War  II, and  the breakdown  of the Bretton  Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates. An alternative  approach  is to acknowledge implicitly 
that such changes occur in a more frequent and continual way, and 
therefore  to use either  a rolling  sample  or  a continually  expanding  sample 
with  discounting  of past  observations.  Under  either  approach,  the sample 
of relevant  experience is finite, and in general the resulting  estimated 
parameter  values therefore  change as additional  observations  become 
available. 
Following  much other work on U.S. financial  markets,  the specific 
change  assumed  here  to demarcate  relevant  data  is the Treasury-Federal 
Reserve Accord negotiated  in 1951  and implemented  in the year or so 
thereafter.38  After  the elimination  of several  additional  quarters  so as to 
avoid the Korean War period, the sample used to represent market 
participants'  perceptions  therefore  begins  with the first  quarter  of 1954. 
Estimating  p, UE,  4, andp  for  the model  described  in  the third  assumption 
above, using  maximum  likelihood  methods  and quarterly  data  for 1954- 
88,  results  in  the  following  values  (asymptotic  t-statistics  in  parentheses): 
38. In particular,  the relationship  between stock returns  and interest  rates has been 
sharply  different  since  the accord  than  it was before.  See, for example,  Campbell  (1989). 164  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Ai=  0.0247 
(4.0) 
?r.,  0.0048 
(  1)  (7.7) 
=  -  0.2320 
(5.0) 
p=  0.0330. 
(1.7) 
Because the model  estimated  here  is closely motivated  by the results  for 
the Poisson model developed in the paper's first section, it is not 
surprising  that these estimates are almost indistinguishable  from those 
shown in equation  6 above.39  Also, as before, the procedure  for picking 
out extraordinary  shocks yields 1962:2,  1970:2,  1974:3  and 1987:4  as the 
only four quarters  in which a realization  of the extraordinary  return 
component  is estimated  to have occurred. 
Given parameter  values like those shown in equation 11, market 
participants  choose the shares of stocks and Treasury bills in their 
portfolios  so as to maximize  their  expected utility, 
(12)  max  {M, - -  Vt},  Ot  2 
where  c, is the portfolio  share  invested  in stocks (the single  risky  asset), 
and  M, and Vt  are, respectively, the perceived  mean  and  variance  of the 
rate of return  on the entire portfolio. The time subscripts  on M and V 
emphasize the point that these perceptions are continuously being 
updated  as the investors' information  set grows over time. Given the 
two-component  structure  of the risk associated with the excess return 
on stocks, the perceived  mean  and variance  are, respectively, 
(13)  Mt  =  ot,(t2, +  j5Ai,), 
(14)  V.  =  ?,  [  5i  _ 
+AWI%h. 
39. The Poisson  model  and the model  estimated  here  are non-nested  though  they are 
closely related  (see again  footnote 37). Application  of the Akaike  Information  Criterion 
suggests  that  the specification  estimated  in this section  is preferable.  The  two models  have 
the same  number  of parameters  (assuming  U2 = 0), and  the likelihood  of the Poisson  model 
is marginally  less than  the likelihood  of the model  presented  here. Benjamin M. Friedman and David I. Laibson  165 
The solution  that  follows from  the first-order  condition  for equation 12, 
after  substituting  M, and V,  from  equations  13  and 14, is 
*A.  +  P.+. 
(15)  Ott  p[A62  +  A,(l  -  2A 
where * indicates  the optimal  value.40  For the values of  ,u,  qj,  and  p 
shown  in equation  11,  and  for p = 7.8 (chosen  from  the third  row of table 
3), the optimal  portfolio  allocation  for a market  participant  who behaves 
as described  in the four  assumptions  given above is cx,  = 0.332-that  is, 
to put 33.2 percent of the portfolio  into stocks and the remaining  66.8 
percent  into Treasury  bills. 
Because this optimal allocation is based on the parameter  values 
shown in equation 11, which were estimated  using data spanning  1954- 
88, it should  properly  refer to investors choosing their  portfolios  in the 
first quarter of  1989. According to  the fourth assumption, market 
participants  at any earlier  time would not have known the values of 4 
and  p but instead  would have had to estimate  them using the data then 
available. In general, with a different information  set the resulting 
parameter  estimates would have been different. And with different 
parameter  estimates, the optimal  portfolio  choice in equation 15 would 
also have been different. 
The solid line in figure  3 shows how market  participants'  estimate  of 
p (the  probability  of a stock market  crash  occurring)  would  have changed 
over time, had they been reestimating  the model in the way described 
by the  fourth  assumption  in each quarter  beginning  at the end of 1962:2.41 
The figure  plots the estimated values of p for a series of 106 samples, 
each beginning  in 1954:  1, and  ending  in successive quarters  from 1962:2 
to 1988:4.42  The variation  is substantial. (By contrast, the estimated 
values of 4, the magnitude  of the crash if it occurs, never deviate much 
40. This solution  treats  the estimated  values of all four parameters  describing  stock 
returns  as if they were known  with  certainty. 
41. As stated  in the fourth  assumption,  investors  undertake  this estimation  with the 
belief  that  they  know  ,u  and  oj. Both  these parameters  are  therefore  set to their  full  sample 
maximum  likelihood  values  whatever  sample  period  is used. 
42. The model yielded no sensible value of t' for samples  ending  before 1962:2  (the 
first  observation  picked  out as a realization  of the extraordinary  component  in any sample 
ending later than 1962:1).  We also experimented  with an estimation procedure  that 
discounted  past observations,  as in Friedman  and Kuttner  (1988),  at a rate of 0.99 (per 
quarter),  but  the results  were  indistinguishable  from  those shown  in the figure. 166  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Figure 3. Estimated Probability of Crash Using Expanding Sample Perioda 
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from - 0.23.) The  values  ofA range  from  a minimum  of 0.0144  (estimated 
with the sample ending in 1970:1)  to a maximum  of 0.0385 (estimated 
with the sample  ending  in 1975:3).  Although  the correspondence  is not 
precise, the general  tendency is clearly for p to decline as time passes 
after  a crash,  and  then  to rise sharply  in the aftermath  of each new crash. 
Variation  over time in the perceived probability  of a stock market 
crash, over anything  like the range  shown  forpJ  in figure  3, can plausibly 
account for changes in behavior  that-again treating  the willingness  to 
hold stocks as a metaphor  for willingness  to take  on risky  positions  more 
generally-correspond to what is required  by Minsky's financial  insta- 
bility hypothesis. A risk-averse investor choosing a portfolio for the 
coming  year  will take a more  exposed position  when the probability  that 
a crash  will occur within  the year  is less than  one in seventeen (based  on Benjamin M. Friedman and David I. Laibson  167 
quarterly  p = 0.0144)  than  when it is better  than  one in seven (based  on 
p = 0.0385).  Similarly,  an  investor  deciding  whether  to acquire  an  illiquid 
asset will act differently  if the chances are perceived to be even that a 
crash  will occur  within  the next twelve years  than  if the chances  are  even 
within  the next four years. 
The solid line in figure 4 illustrates the dependence of investors' 
behavior  on their perceptions of the likelihood of a crash, within the 
restricted  context of the one-period  one-risky-asset  model treated ex- 
plicitly above, by plotting  the values of ox*  (the optimal  portfolio  share 
invested in risky assets) calculated  as in equation 15  from  the values of 
iA, plotted  by the solid line in figure  3 and the corresponding  value of 4' 
(not plotted) together with constant values of R and &W  as shown in 
equation 11. The effect of changing  perceptions  of the probability  of a 
crash is striking,  with xt*  varying  from a maximum  of 49.8 percent (in 
1970:  1)  to a minimum  of 29.3 percent  (1974:3).  It is especially  interesting 
that,  although  the ox*  series is derived  purely  from  data  on stock returns, 
it also roughly  corresponds  (inversely)  to measures  of risk assessments 
that  are  observable  in debt  markets.  For example,  the simple  correlation 
between c,*  and the interest rate spread  of Baa-rated  corporate  bonds 
over 10-year  U.S. Treasury  bonds  is - 0.51, so that  on average  the model 
estimated  here suggests a decreased willingness  to hold stock at times 
when bond market participants  are demanding  an increased default 
premium  on debts of less than investment  grade. This correspondence 
gives further  support  to the notion of using the perceived  probability  of 
stock market  crashes to stand  for perceived  riskiness  more  generally  in 
Minsky's  richer  context. 
It is also possible, of course, that, contrary  to the fourth  assumption 
above, market  participants  do not act as if they know  the values of pL  and 
Cy2 describing  the ordinary  once-per-period  component  of stock returns 
but instead  estimate  them in each period  just as they estimate  p and 4. 
In that  case, estimated  values [i and  C2 would in general  vary over time 
as well and  there  would  be two further  reasons  for portfolio  choice cx*  to 
vary. The broken line in figure 3 plots a series for pt when all four 
parameters,  [ and  C2 as well as  p and  4, are  estimated  anew  each period. 
The broken  line in figure  4 plots the corresponding  series for cx*.  The 
effect of the sharp increases in p after each of the four observations 
identified  as crashes is still evident, but with [i, and r,,, also changing, 
Ox,*  is no longer  close to a mirror  of changing  p,  . The estimated  values [Lt 168  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Figure 4: Estimated Optimal Portfolio Share of Stocks at End of Each Sample Perioda 
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(not plotted) decline from the mid-  1960s until the mid-  1980s, thereby 
depressing  ox*.  Also, the estimated  values  a,  (not  plotted)  increase  after 
the mid-1970s,  depressing  oxt  yet further. The correlation  between oxt 
calculated  in  this  way and  the Baa-Treasury  interest  rate  spread  is -0.70. 
Within  the limited  context of the one-period  one-risky-asset  model, 
therefore,  these changes  over time in the behavior  of risk-averse  inves- 
tors correspond  to the central phenomenon  hypothesized by Minsky. 
As time passes since the most recent market  crash, investors tend to 
perceive  the probability  of a crash  as smaller,  and hence take ever more 
exposed positions. Given the institutional  richness of Minsky's own 
work, it is not difficult  to translate  this behavior into a much broader 
context  including,  for  example,  business  ventures  in  which  the prospects 
for success hinge  on whether  a market  crash  does or does not occur, and 
loans against  ventures  in which the prospects  for default  similarly  hinge Benjamin M. Friedman and David I. Laibson  169 
on whether  or not a crash occurs. In each case, the key result is that a 
risk-averse  investor  is more willing  to enter into any given risky trans- 
action as the perceived  probability  of a crash is lower, and that with a 
limited  sample  of observations  the perceived  probability  declines  as time 
passes since the most recent  crash. 
It is worth  pointing  out that, as is familiar  in such models, this result 
includes  a form  of internal  contradiction.  In particular,  as the perceived 
crash  probability  i3 declines, the resulting  true  underlying  probability  of 
a crash is actually  rising. Lower  p, leads investors to take increasingly 
extended  and  exposed positions, and so the system as a whole becomes 
increasingly  susceptible  to a financial  crisis in the event of an adverse 
shock. The contradiction  is that investors, acting  only on the basis of jp, 
estimated  from  observed  prior  returns,  do not recognize  this increasing 
systemic fragility;  if they did they would choose different, more con- 
servative  portfolios.  As in other  formulations  of the Minsky  hypothesis, 
therefore,  some element  of myopia  is a crucial  ingredient  here as well.43 
Another  way of thinking  about  this myopia  is to recognize  that  investors 
are basing their decisions on a model in which returns  are temporally 
uncorrelated,  but the resulting behavior of these investors tends to 
generate  unforeseen  cycles of speculation,  crashes, and retrenchment. 
One implication  of this pattern  is that crash episodes will actually be 
negatively autocorrelated, a result that could explain the repeated 
empirical  finding  that stock prices are mean-reverting."4 
Concluding  Thoughts 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper supports several 
conclusions  about  the usefulness  of a two-component  representation  of 
stock  returns.  First,  the behavior  of quarterly  stock returns  in  the United 
States since World  War  II is consistent  with a representation  consisting 
of two random  components, an ordinary  component realized in each 
quarter  and  an  extraordinary  crash  component  realized  only  at  infrequent 
43. As Tobin (1989)  put it in commenting  on Minsky's own formulation,  "Rational 
expectations  adherents  will doubtless  object  that the alleged  cycle would vanish  as soon 
as borrowers  and  lenders  understood  it." The existence of such myopic  traders  has been 
proposed  in several  recent  papers.  See, for example,  De Long  and  others  (1988). 
44. See again  Poterba  and  Summers  (1988);  and  Fama  and  French  (1988). 170  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
and  irregular  intervals.  Second, viewing stock returns  in this way sheds 
new  light  on  familiar  questions  about  the  time  series  properties  of returns. 
Specifically,  the evidence for both serial  correlation  and persistence  of 
volatility is greater for the ordinary component of returns than for 
observed  returns  consisting  of both ordinary  and extraordinary  compo- 
nents. Third,  risk-averse  market  participants,  allocating  their  portfolios 
and attempting  to learn about the magnitude  and frequency  of market 
crashes  from  evidence that  they have in hand,  could plausibly  behave in 
such a way as to give rise to the macroeconomic  phenomenon  posited 
by Minsky's  financial  instability  hypothesis. 
One consistent assumption underlying  these results bears closer 
attention,  however.  In  particular,  the  conceptual  apparatus  used  throughout 
this paper  to divide observed stock returns  into ordinary  and extraordi- 
nary components  simply assumes that the two occur independently  of 
one another-that  is, that a crash episode is equally likely to occur 
whether there is a positive or a negative realization  of the ordinary 
random  element, or, if there is a negative realization  of this element, 
equally likely whether it is large or small. In the absence of a unique 
interpretation  of these occasional crashes-something we explicitly do 
not attempt  to offer here-it  is difficult  either  to support  or to reject  this 
assumption  out of hand. Because it is central  to the analysis  carried  out 
throughout  the paper,  however, it is worth  questioning  closely. 
For example, it is certainly  not implausible  that any given shock that 
may cause a market  crash-a  major  adverse political development, a 
run  of bad  economic news, a Shiller-style  epidemic  of negative  psychol- 
ogy, or whatever-is  more likely actually to do so if stock prices are 
already  falling  for  other  reasons. Similarly,  under  the Minsky  hypothesis 
the likelihood  that an extraordinary  adverse shock will interact  with an 
increasingly  fragile financial  structure  in such a way as to produce a 
crisis could well be greater  in the presence of a negative realization  of 
the economy's ordinary  random processes. Nor need a relationship 
along any of these lines be simple or linear. It is entirely  plausible  that 
what  makes  the market  vulnerable  to a crash  when such a shock occurs 
is not just a negative realization  of the ordinary  component  of returns 
but a large negative realization  (greater  than, say, one standard  devia- 
tion). 
To be sure, simple  examination  of the empirical  results presented  in 
this paper offers no particular  support for this idea. The estimated Benjamin M. Friedman and David I. Laibson  171 
realizations  of the ordinary component of stock returns in the four 
specific quarters identified as crash episodes include two positives 
(1962:2  and 1970:2)  and  two negatives  (1974:3  and 1987:4).  But  this result 
is hardly  surprising  because  of the difficulty  of statistically  distinguishing 
crash episodes from large  negative realizations  of the ordinary  compo- 
nent  when the two covary. A more  general  model, explicitly  including  a 
procedure  for resolving this identification  problem, would be compli- 
cated to  implement empirically, but not impossible. Alternatively, 
individual  case studies  exploiting  nonprice  data-for  example,  business 
failure  and  debt  default  rates-could  provide  a way to unravel  the effect 
of the ordinary  component and the extraordinary  component during 
crash episodes. Especially in conjunction  with a well-developed sub- 
stantive view about what kinds of shocks represent  "crash potential," 
research  along  either  of these two lines could prove instructive. 
APPENDIX 
Maximizing  the Likelihood  Function 
MAXIMUM  likelihood  estimates  of p, o2,  4, c2,  and X  from  equations 1-5 
are  given by 
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where T is sample size and the bracketed term is the log-likelihood 
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maximized with respect to m,,  conditional on the maximum likelihood 
estimates ', cr  , cr2,  and  X, 
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where m, is constrained to take on nonnegative integer values. Comments 
and Discussion 
Hyman P. Minsky:  As Benjamin  M. Friedman  and David I. Laibson 
recognize,  their  paper,  which initially  focuses on stock prices and  offers 
a model  to explain  their  excessive volatility,  has a relevance  that  extends 
beyond  the behavior  of stock prices. In particular,  their  paper  instructs 
us on how to investigate  complex  processes that  have some components 
whose impact  is felt quickly  and others whose impact  is delayed while 
variables  cumulate-that is, as the environment  changes. One way the 
Friedman-Laibson  insight  for the explanation  of excessive volatility  of 
stock prices  can be extended  is by transforming  it into an explanation  of 
the historical  pattern  of mild and deep business cycles. To do so, it is 
necessary  to specify what  cumulates,  why such cumulation  takes place, 
and  how such  cumulation  changes  the environment  so that  deeper  cycles 
can be triggered.  Once such cumulative  processes are identified,  it is 
possible  to specify both what happens  during  the deeper  cycles and the 
economic  relations  that  can contain  such deeper  cycles. 
Friedman  and Laibson observe that the historical  volatility  in stock 
prices is too great  to be ascribed  to processes of the type that give rise 
to a "normal"  distribution.  Because the prices of stocks that  are traded 
on exchanges  can be adapted  to be used as proxies for the prices of real 
capital  assets, that  observation  can be extended to support  the proposi- 
tion  that  the volatility  in the market  valuation  not only of financial  assets 
but also of capital  assets as collected in firms  is too great  to be ascribed 
to random  errors. What is needed is a construct that accounts for the 
excessive richness  of the tails of the distribution. 
Friedman  and Laibson  provide  such a construct.  They posit that two 
processes generate  stock prices and, by the extension they draw  in the 
section  titled  "Market  Fluctuations  and  Macroeconomic  Fluctuations," 
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the business cycles of experience. One is a ran-dom  error  process that 
would  generate  a nice bell-shaped  distribution  if it were the only process 
operating.  ' 
The other is a Poisson process that kicks in from time to time with a 
large  displacement.  Friedman  and Laibson identify large negative dis- 
placements  of stock prices as crashes. 
Friedman  and Laibson tie their work into what they call "Hyman 
Minsky's 'financial  instability  hypothesis,' " which holds that cumula- 
tive changes in the financial  structure-mainly in the liabilities  used to 
finance  positions  in assets but  also in the assets and  liabilities  acceptable 
in portfolios-take  place over a run of good times. As a result, an 
originally  robust  financial  structure,  one characterized  by hedge  finance 
(as in 1946), is transformed  into a fragile one, one characterized  by 
substantial  speculative  and Ponzi finance  (much  as we see today). The 
hypothesis grew out of my efforts to explain the pattern  of mild and 
severe recessions-depressions noted by Joseph Schumpeter, Milton 
Friedman  and  Anna  Schwartz,  and  Moses Abramovitz.2  My work  linked 
the difference  between mild  and serious  recessions to the robustness  or 
fragility of  the financial structure and the large reactions to  small 
proximate  stimuli  that take place in fragile  structures.  I argued  that the 
behavior  of profit-seeking  units  over a run  of good times transforms  the 
financial structure  from being robust to being fragile, so that crises, 
financial  disturbances,  and debt deflations,  which characterize  a deep 
depression  cycle, can take place.3 
I appreciate  that  Friedman  and  Laibson  link  their  detailed,  innovative, 
and  sophisticated  work  to ideas I put  forth  in various  forms  over the past 
thirty years. I want to take the opportunity  afforded  by their paper  to 
enlarge upon what I now, long after the initial labeling  of a particular 
interpretation  of experience and literature  as the financial  instability 
hypothesis, mean  by the financial  instability  hypothesis. In particular,  I 
want to examine whether the hypothesis was advanced, as Friedman 
and Laibson put it, "with less than explicit grounding  in the theory of 
economic behavior" and to address the question posed by Friedman 
1. This  might  well  be a Frisch-Slutsky  process  like  the  one with  which  Milton  Friedman 
and Robert Lucas worked. See Frisch (1933);  Slutsky (1937);  Friedman  (1968);  Lucas 
(1972). 
2. Schumpeter  (1939);  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963);  Abramovitz  (1959). 
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and Laibson  about "the relevant  actors in the economy" who "change 
their  behavior  so as to erode the financial  system's ability  to withstand 
a  major  shock  without  sustaining  a rupture  ofthe kind  typically  associated 
with a severe downturn  in real  output  and spending.'" 
I used the phrase "the financial  instability  hypothesis" to describe a 
deviant  interpretation  of Keynes's General  Theory  that I advanced  in a 
book, John Maynard Keynes.4 I characterized Keynes's  General Theory 
as advancing  an investment theory of business cycles and a financial 
theory  of investment.  I also hypothesized  that  Keynes was familiar  with 
Irving  Fisher's "Debt Deflation  Theory  of Great  Depressions" and  that 
some of the special  results  of the General  Theory  dealt  with the effect of 
a debt deflation upon objective conditions facing businessmen and 
bankers  and the way they view the world.5  As a result, a debt deflation 
or even a less dramatic  financial  crisis affects the investment,  financing, 
and  employment  decisions businessmen  and  bankers  make. 
The two price levels of a capitalist  economy that are relevant  to the 
financial  instability  view are  the price  level of capital  assets and  the price 
level of labor  or, equivalently,  of current  output.  In the famous  rebuttal 
to Professor  Viner,  and  in  other  post-General  Theot-y  arguments,  Keynes 
identified  liquidity  preference  as the determinant  of the price level of 
capital  assets, what I have usually  called  Pk.6  Investment  is determined 
by the gap  between  the price  level of capital  and  financial  assets, Pk, and 
the price  level of investment  output,  Pi, along  with financing  conditions 
that integrate  internal  financing  with the attitude toward risktaking  of 
the proximate borrowers and lenders at the time investment, asset 
acquisition,  and  financing  decisions are made.7 
Keynes argued  in chapter 17 of the General Theory  that the return 
from holding any asset can be treated as being determined  by three 
factors:  q, the yield of the asset; c, the carrying  costs of the asset; and 1, 
the liquidity  premium.  I stretched Keynes's argument  to include the 
cash payment  commitments  that are embodied  in the contracts  used to 
finance  positions  in financial  and capital  assets in the carrying  costs, the 
4. Minsky  (1975). 
5. Fisher  (1933). 
6. Viner (1936);  Keynes (1937);  Keynes (1946). Viner identified  Keynes's liquidity 
preference  as a demand  for money  relation  with  the interest  rate  as an argument.  Keynes 
emphatically  rejected  that  interpretation. 
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c's. This made the q's and the c's cash flows. The q's were expected 
gross profits  and the c's were contractual  payment commitments  that 
reflected  market  conditions  and expectations that ruled  when the con- 
tracts  were signed.  To be more specific, the c's due at any time were the 
result of earlier  negotiations  between businessmen  and bankers. They 
embody the expectations about profits and financing  conditions that 
these agents held when the contracts  that determine  today's payments 
were negotiated. Financial commitments, along with the economy's 
inherited  capital assets, labor force, and rules that guide institutional 
behavior, are legacies of the past that limit what can be done in the 
present. 
The 1  return  that assets earn is subjective. It represents  the value of 
being insured against contingencies that can make a unit unable to 
purchase,  hire, or fulfill  payment  commitments.  Money is an asset that 
derives its value from  its ability  to discharge  financial  commitments  and 
from  the ability  to purchase  and  to maneuver  that  it bestows upon  those 
who hold it. The price of a unit of money is always 1, and the money 
prices of assets that yield mainly  q -  c rise and fall as the quantity  of 
assets that yield mainly  1  rise and fall and as the subjective  value put on 
I falls and rises. Keynes is interpreted  as proposing a quantity-and- 
quality-of-money  explanation  of asset prices.8 
This Keynes q, c, and  l construct  yields the prices  of individual  capital 
and  financial  assets as well as capital  assets collected in bundles  as firms. 
The market  prices of firms at every date place values on intangibles, 
such as market  position or power, and reflect  the auras  of optimism  or 
pessimism about the future that are assigned to firms, industries, and 
economies.9 
The Keynes model  of a capitalist  economy is driven  by both  objective 
developments  and subjective  expectations.  The value of liquidity,  in the 
form  of the holding  of a stock of money or of assets that are taken  to be 
readily transformed  into money, depends upon the adequacy and the 
reliability  of the cash flows from  income  generation  that  are expected to 
8. This  is wedded  to a money  wage  cost explanation  of output  prices.  Ferri  and  Minsky 
(1984). 
9. The  pricing  of  individual  firms  and  assets  presents  no  particularconceptual  problems. 
The derivation  of the index number,  the price level of capital  assets, Pk, is fraught  with 
conceptual  difficulties.  However, there is always the Dow Jones and the Standard  and 
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be available  to fulfill  each period's current  payment  commitments  and 
the expected  performance  of the markets  in which  units  exchange  assets 
that  are held in a portfolio  for money. The value of liquidity  depends  on 
the expected performance  of aggregate cash flows (profits) and the 
expected likelihood  that  financial  markets  may be disrupted. 
The contracts  that are closed on any day reflect both the extent to 
which current  and  recent  q's were available  to fulfill  the c's, for both the 
economy as a whole and the particular  units that are negotiating  con- 
tracts, and what the model  of the economy that helps form  the expecta- 
tions of the negotiating  units tells them about the future  of the q's and 
the c's. The principal  actors in creating  financial  contracts  are bankers 
and  businessmen:  the analytical  core of the financial  instability  hypoth- 
esis is a model of banker-businessman  negotiations.  The banker-busi- 
nessman negotiations  that lead to the financing  of investment  activity 
are the proximate  determinants  of income, profits, and employment. 
Each participant  in such negotiations  has private  information  as well as 
its own market  power.  10 
Because the financial  instability  hypothesis was formulated  before 
the current  fashion of formally  reducing  aggregate  behavior  to stylized 
unit  behavior  took hold, it was not reduced  to a formal  model based on 
representative  agents  with  asymmetric  information.  The  task  of a "mod- 
ern" modeling of  the phenomena that are critical to  the financial 
instability  hypothesis remains  undone. The emphasis on the value of 1 
and expected q's as determinants  of the price level of capital assets 
means that the model of the economy used by the relevant agents 
(businessmen,  bankers,  and  managers  of money)  in forming  their  expec- 
tations  is of vital importance. 
The  financial  instability  hypothesis  assumes  that  the models  of system 
performance  that  help  form  the  expectations  of businessmen  and  bankers 
are affected  by the recent performance  of the economy and by agents' 
knowledge  of its more remote past. The critical  agents are unsure  how 
the  economy  will  perform,  because  they are  unsure  of the effect of recent 
institutional  and environmental  changes. As a result, businessmen, 
bankers,  and managers  of money may markedly-and unpredictably- 
change  their  behavior  in response  to small  changes in system behavior, 
10. William  Janeway,  an investment  banker,  stated what I call Janeway's  first  law: 
"Entrepreneurs  lie." A banker's  cliche  is "I've never  seen a pro  forma  I didn't  like." 178  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
if the changes  affect their  belief in, or the structure  of, the model of the 
economy they use to form  expectations. 
Agents know that there have been financial  crises and deep depres- 
sions in the past. Legislative and administrative  changes have taken 
place since the last crisis and depression,  in part  as a reaction  to crises 
and  depression.  In addition,  market-driven  institutional  and  usage  changes 
have taken place. Furthermore  the structure of financing relations 
undergoes  systematic  changes  as success breeds optimism  about  future 
success. The model that guides expectation  formation  is more volatile 
than the constructs  that rely on the decay of the impact of a previous 
crisis or depression or on some universally valid model of system 
behavior. Furthermore,  as Keynes noted, changes in the model that 
underlies  expectation  formation  need not proceed at the same pace for 
different  agents  or classes of agents. 
Every  agent  has three  sources  of liquidity:  cash flows  from  operations 
(gross profits for business, wages for households, taxes for govern- 
ments),  contract  realizations,  and  portfolio  adjustments.  The  importance 
of liquidity  in the form of monetary  and marketable  assets diminishes 
whenever  the felt assurance  of units  (bankers  and  businessmen,  mainly) 
of the cash flow  from  operations  and  from  contract  fulfillment  increases. 
The success of policy in preventing  any sharp and sustained drop in 
gross business profits  over the postwar  period  has decreased  the impor- 
tance of liquidity in the form of asset holdings. This decline in the 
subjective  yield of liquidity  from  assets has led to increases  in the prices 
of assets that are valued mainly  for the cash they are expected to yield 
and  increases  in  the  payment  commitments  that  income  flows  are  deemed 
capable  of sustaining.  The diminished  importance  attached  to portfolio 
liquidity  has helped sustain business investment and consumer debt- 
financed  spending  during  recent financial  traumas  that in other circum- 
stances may well have disrupted  income  flows. 
Two views-first,  that  sustaining  aggregate  business  profits  is the key 
variable  for successful stabilization  policy and, second, that the com- 
position of aggregate  demand  rather  than any intrinsic  productivity  of 
capital-determined  profits-are joined to the q, c, 1  view of asset values 
in the financial  instability  hypothesis. The Kalecki perspective on the 
national  accounts, which emphasizes  income distribution  and in partic- 
ular  the  way  in  which  profits  are  related  to investment  and  the  government 
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the success or failure to validate debt in each period is a significant 
determinant  of the behavior  of the economy. 
The emphasis in Friedman  and Laibson's empirical  work is on the 
choice of assets for  a portfolio.  I suggest  that  a shift  of research  emphasis 
to the liabilities used to finance positions in assets is warranted.  The 
same considerations-the  erosion of portfolio conservatism, agents' 
unsureness  of the significance  of novel usages and institutions,  beliefs 
that this is a new era, and  the other  factors that  lead to the bidding  up of 
equity prices by the representative  household  and its agents-apply  to 
the decisionmakers in both ordinary business firms (the proximate 
owners of the economy's capital assets) and the complex of financial 
institutions  that are the main  proximate  owners of the liabilities  issued 
by ordinary  firms. 
One  reason  for shifting  to an argument  based upon  liability  structures 
is that the ruling  pattern,  of cash in from  operating  in the economy and 
cash out committed  by liability  structures,  determines  the vulnerability 
of the financial  system to disruptive  movements,  the vulnerability  of the 
economy to deep depressions, and the need for intervention  by central 
banks  and  governments  to contain  crises and  depressions.  Furthermore, 
the argument  about the pattern of income receipts and contractual 
payment  commitments  for business firms can be extended to include 
households, domestic government  debt, and international  financial  ar- 
rangements. 
The language I use-hedge,  speculative, and Ponzi-to  describe 
financial  structures  has put some off. In a hedge financial  structure,  the 
expected "cash flows in" exceed the "cash payment  commitments"  on 
the account of both principal  and interest as far ahead as a reasonable 
person looks. A hedge financing  unit is likely to have a high ratio of 
equity to debt. In speculative or rollover financing, the net income 
portion  of gross  cash flow  exceeds the interest  payments  committed,  but 
the cash flows are insufficient  to meet the payments commitments  on 
principal.  Banks are speculative financing  units, as is any firm that 
finances  holdings  of long-lived  assets with short-term  debt. Such orga- 
nizations  speculate  that  refinancing  will  be available  on reasonable  terms 
and are vulnerable  to disruptions  in financial  markets.  Ponzi finance- 
and I have been criticized  for using the name of a Boston swindler  for 
what is a not uncommon  and often legitimate  business practice-takes 
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and the interest  is folded into the principal  owed. If Ponzi finance  is not 
used  to finance  long-gestation  investments,  then  it  amounts  to decreasing 
the equity  account even as indebtedness  increases. Ponzi finance  has a 
natural  termination  point when equity goes negative, but all too often 
creative  accounting  obscures  this transformation. 
The "Minsky" hypothesis can be stated in terms of the hedge, 
speculative, and Ponzi characterization  of financing  postures. Over a 
period of good times liability structures  change so that the weight of 
hedge  financing  units  decreases and  the weight  of speculative  and  Ponzi 
financing  units increases. Note that any change toward  a conservative 
view of what constitutes an apt liability structure  for holding capital 
assets will put pressure on firms that are in speculative and Ponzi 
financing  postures to use their cash flows to clean up their balance 
sheets: to use retained  earnings  to retire  debt rather  than  as the basis for 
leveraged  investment.  In addition  speculative  and  Ponzi  debtors  may be 
constrained  to sell assets to improve  their  balance sheets. Such making 
of position  by selling  position  can well lead to a fall in the price of assets 
being offered. As a result a smaller amount of cash than the books 
indicated  will be generated.  If the process is not aborted  by the Federal 
Reserve  or some similar  agency the price  level of assets can fall sharply. 
This can lead to a broad  erosion of mark-to-market  net worths and to a 
decline in the ability  to finance  investment.  As a result  investment  falls 
and so will aggregate  business profits.  1  I 
In a big-government  capitalism,  the impact  on profits  of a decline in 
investment  is offset by an increase  in the government  deficit,  which is a 
plus  for  business  profits.  Once  business  profits  are  sustained,  the  collapse 
scenario  of asset prices that characterizes  a deep depression  will not be 
acted out. Modeling  liability  structures  and integrating  such structures 
with asset pricing  is a key to understanding  the dynamics  of intensely 
financial  capitalist  economies. 
In their closing remarks  Friedman  and Laibson note that there is a 
contradiction  in the Minsky hypothesis in that even as the agents 
themselves  view a deep depression  or financial  crisis as being  less likely, 
the objective  portfolio  postures  tend  to make  a depression  or crisis more 
11. In a small-government  capitalism  with a central  bank  constrained  by rules, this 
dynamic  could  lead to serious  depressions.  It is worth  recalling  that  the Federal  Reserve 
was constrained  by rules about  gold reserves and the special place of discounted  paper 
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likely.12  This apparent  paradox, which I believe I usually noted, is 
resolved by pointing  out that the interval  over which debt is built up, 
thus making  the objective conditions  more favorable  to a crisis, is long 
enough for substantial changes in institutions to have occurred. In 
addition,  claims that more is known now than earlier  and that policy is 
wiser now than in the past gain credence and affect expectations  about 
system performance. Expectation formation takes into account that 
"The world has changed" and that "They won't let it happen," even 
though agents are not sure who "they" are and what "they" will do. 
Even as agents note the unfavorable  objective circumstances, their 
significance  for today is discounted.  13 
To return  to Friedman  and Laibson's comments about the Minsky 
hypothesis,  the financial  instability  model  focuses on the behavior  of the 
proximate  agents, businessmen  and  bankers,  who determine  investment 
activity. The model does not reduce  the agents  of the economy to some 
ultimate  units  such as households  that  aim  to maximize  the present  value 
of consumption  flows. 
In the financial  instability hypothesis the cumulating  process that 
transforms a system that is  virtually immune to  deep and serious 
depressions  into one that  is susceptible  to such depressions  results  from 
decisions made by businessmen who invest and finance positions in 
capital assets, by bankers (commercial  and investment) who arrange 
financing  and  take  positions  in assets, and  by money  managers  who have 
views about  the appropriate  liability  structure  for financing  positions in 
capital  and  financial  assets and  investment.  Each unit  in these classes of 
agents  bases its decisions  on current  constraints-legacies from  the past 
that are more or less constraining-and expectations of the future- 
mainly expectations about profits and the way financial  markets will 
function.  The model of the economy that guides expectation  formation 
recognizes  that  serious  depressions  have occurred.  Furthermore,  agents 
are  not sure  that  their  model  has got the economy quite  right.  As a result 
a sharp  change  in  the model  used in  expectation  formation  can  be induced 
by events. 
According  to the financial  instability  hypothesis, the relevant  agents 
are rational  and  calculating,  but they recognize  that the world in which 
12. Abba  Lerner  accurately  characterized  my view as "Stability  is destabilizing.  " 
13. Giordano(1989). 182  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
they live is irrational  or at least not fully rational.  Agents recognize  that 
the model of the economy they use cannot explain  the evolution of the 
economy through  time nor  predict  the impact  of novel institutions.  It is 
the uncertain  knowledge  underlying  the model  used to form  expectations 
that  makes  it  possible  for  large  repercussions  to follow  from  small  events. 
An occasional downside  displacement,  such as Friedman  and Laibson 
model as a Poisson distribution,  becomes a systemic or endogenous 
event  when  it  takes  place  as a result  of heavily  indebted  liability  structures 
and  when the model  of the economy held by agents  changes  in response 
to such a displacement  so as to amplify  the initial  displacement. 
In today's world  large  governments  effectively prevent  a collapse of 
profits and central  banks intervene to assure that during  situations of 
potential  crisis not only banks but also other units that may otherwise 
be forced to make position by trying to sell position are refinanced. 
These two sets of interventions  have successfully contained  the aggre- 
gate reactions to the sometimes serious financial crises of the past 
decades.  14 
The combination  of a financial  environment  that evolves and expec- 
tations that change rapidly has been behind the deep depressions of 
history. As we look back on the 1980s  we may at first  glance see a long 
expansion after 1982, but we should also see the regular  central bank 
interventions  (I include the refinancing  of the savings and loans as a 
central  bank  intervention)  and the government  deficits  that underwrote 
aggregate  profits.  This combination  has to date contained  the impact  of 
the financial  crisis and rapid  changes in asset values such as the stock 
market crashes of  1987 and 1989. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
processes that  made  for deep depressions  in capitalist  economies, which 
Friedman  and  Laibson  help us understand,  are  alive and  well: only their 
effect has been contained. 
General Discussion 
A number of panelists criticized specific features of the authors' 
model, including  the statistical  process assumed  to govern  stock returns 
and the way investors are assumed to use historical data in making 
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portfolio  decisions. Christopher  Sims argued  that the model makes too 
sharp  a distinction  between big shocks and normal  shocks. As a result 
the authors  fail to identify  three  other  shocks in the postwar  period,  one 
negative  and  two positive, that  would  be characterized  as extraordinary 
shocks  under  a more  flexible  parameterization.  Steven Durlauf  reasoned 
that the authors  should have allowed for the possibility of correlation 
between the normal  and the extraordinary  component of stock prices 
and then tested for the null hypothesis of no correlation.  Charles  Holt 
suggested  the possibility  of explaining  the special features  of the distri- 
bution  of stock returns  by making  use of recent work in chaos theory. 
Sims  observed  that  historical  data  do not do a good  job of discriminating 
among  the wide variety of statistical  models that have been advocated 
by different  investigators.  Hence, he argued,  the rational  expectations 
assumption  that there is a true stochastic process, and that everyone 
knows it, is not sensible. He suggested  that  research  be directed  toward 
models in which market participants  are not sure of the underlying 
stochastic  process and  have different  views about  it. 
Robert  Hall noted that the authors  assume that an investor's estima- 
tion of the underlying  parameters  of the stochastic returns  process is 
made separately  from his decision about optimal  portfolio shares. He 
suggested  assuming  that  investors  integrate  their  estimation  and  decision 
problems.  In the two-step  process, investors  use the estimated  parame- 
ters as if they were known with certainty  when they make their invest- 
ment  decisions. A one-step procedure  would  take account  of the uncer- 
tainty in the parameter  estimates. Sims thought that such a Bayesian 
procedure  might alter radically predictions about investor behavior. 
Because the extraordinary  shocks are so rare  and uncertainty  about  the 
probability  of their occurring  so high, investors might act very "con- 
servatively"  and not make big shifts in their portfolios  after one of the 
infrequent  large shocks to market  prices. This would be qualitatively 
different  behavior  from that predicted  by the authors'  model. William 
Poole commented that the nonnormality  of the distribution  of stock 
prices reinforces  the importance  of diversification  in portfolios. With 
"fat-tailed"  distributions,  the gains from diversification,  both among 
stocks  and  between  stocks and  other  assets, are even greater  than  in the 
case of normally  distributed  returns. 
George  Akerlof  directed  attention  to the paper's economic model of 
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in the bond market  are constant and therefore unaffected by a stock 
market  crash. The increased  estimate  of risk after a crash would result 
in portfolio  shifts  toward  bonds  and  therefore  to further  declines  in stock 
prices as aftershocks.  This is contrary  to what happened  in the crash  of 
October 1987, which was followed by stock price increases instead. 
Benjamin  Friedman  responded that the model could be modified to 
include debt securities bearing  default  premiums.  Historically, after a 
stock market crash precipitated by extensive defaults, the default 
premiums  become large  for a while and  eventually  fall to normal  levels. 
This process could actually  generate  subsequent  stock price changes  as 
"aftershocks."  In the same vein, Matthew  Shapiro  thought  more  atten- 
tion should  be paid to the equilibrium  requirement  that the demand  for 
and supplies of stocks be equal. He noted that in the authors' model, 
stock is demanded  as a proportion  of wealth, and  is affected  by changes 
in expected return  following  a crash. After  a decline in stock prices, the 
share  of stocks in  wealth  has decreased,  so investors  will  try  to rebalance 
their portfolios. These movements in demand  are certainly important 
for determining  stock prices, but they are excluded  from  the model. 
A number  of comments  were made  about  the implications  of the paper 
for bubble  theories of the stock market.  If the market  rides on positive 
bubbles that occasionally burst, the model predicts periods of zero 
autocorrelation  of returns,  with large  negative deviations  at infrequent 
intervals. Hence, Durlauf  interpreted  the positive serial correlation  in 
the normal component of stock prices as evidence against bubbles. 
George von Furstenberg,  by contrast, suggested  that the paper  helped 
rationalize  bubbles.  The estimated  probability  that  the stock market  will 
crash tends to decline as time passes after a crash. The decline in 
probability  of the bubble's  bursting  combined  with an increasing  size of 
the bubble  is consistent  with constant  rationally  expected returns. 
Several  panelists  were disappointed  that  the paper  did  not have more 
to say about the causes of large and abrupt  movements in the market, 
which  are  treated  simply  as random  events in the basic model. Friedman 
said that a specific explanation  of big market  movements, especially in 
the context of the Minsky hypothesis, would entail examining  other 
economic variables  such as accumulated  liabilities  together  with stock 
prices. It is hard  to identify  specific  events that cause collapses, but the 
Minsky hypothesis is that collapses happen only when there is an 
excessive accumulation  of liabilities. The intended treatment  in this Benjamin M. Friedman and David I. Laibson  185 
paper  is more general, allowing  for collapses due to excessive liability 
accumulation  or to "bursting  bubbles"  or to Shiller-type  "epidemics"; 
but there  is clearly  a price  to be paid  for that generality.  James  Duesen- 
berry  argued  for the importance  of looking  at "fundamental"  variables 
in addition to looking at the market's own behavior, suggesting that 
changes  in investors'  views about  future  inflation  and interest  rates  and 
earnings  are central  to an explanation  of market  movements. Shapiro 
contrasted  the authors'  description  of crashes  with  Fischer  Black's view 
of the recent  crash.  According  to Black, the crash  was caused  by a flight 
to safety-a  sudden  decline  in the demand  for risky  assets-that  caused 
the change  in stock prices, and  not the other  way around.  The price  level 
and  the volatility  of returns  should  be treated  simultaneously. 186  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
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